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We contribute to the debate on how to assess the size of the underground (or shadow) economy by 
proposing a reinterpretation of the traditional Currency Demand Approach (CDA) à la Tanzi. In 
particular, we introduce three main innovations. First, we take a direct measure of the value of cash 
transactions – the flow of cash withdrawn from bank accounts relative to total noncash payments – as 
the dependent variable in the money demand equation. This allows us to avoid unrealistic assumptions 
on the velocity of money and the absence of any irregular transaction in a given year, overcoming two 
severe critiques to the traditional CDA. Second, in place of the tax burden level, usually intended as the 
main motivation for non-compliance, we include among the covariates two direct indicators of detected 
tax evasion. Finally, we control also for the role of illegal production considering crimes like drug dealing 
and prostitution, which – jointly with the shadow economy – contributes to the larger aggregate of the 
non-observed economy and represents a significant component of total cash payments. We propose then 
an application of this ‘modified CDA’ to a panel of 91 Italian provinces for the years 2005-2008.  
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1. Introduction 
The Currency Demand Approach (CDA) is the most popular method to estimate the 
underground (or shadow) economy among the so-called indirect macroeconomic approaches. 
Originally suggested by Cagan (1958), the CDA was subsequently refined and applied by Tanzi 
(1980, 1983) to the U.S. economy, and has been (and still is) widely adopted in the literature.1 
The CDA measures the size of the shadow economy in two stages: the econometric estimation of 
an aggregate money demand equation, with a specific component related to cash transactions in 
the underground sector; and the computation of the value of these shadow transactions via the 
quantity theory of money. Schneider and Enste (2000, 2002) identify and discuss many 
substantial drawbacks of the CDA, pointing out three main criticisms of the basic assumptions 
of this methodology: the absence of any transactions in the underground economy in a given 
base year; the same velocity of money in both the official and the irregular economy; the 
excessive tax burden as the only determinant of the shadow economy. 
The aim of this paper is to contribute to the debate on the measurement of the underground 
economy by proposing a reinterpretation of the CDA that overcomes all these three drawbacks. 
In particular, we propose a ‘modified CDA’ introducing three main innovations to the 
traditional methodology. First, we take a direct measure of the value of cash transactions (the 
flow of cash withdrawn from bank accounts relative to total noncash payments) as the 
dependent variable in the money demand equation, which avoid making specific assumption on 
the velocity of money and the absence of irregular transaction in a given year. Second, in place 
of the tax burden level, we include among the covariates two direct measures of ‘detected’ tax 
evasion, thus overcoming a serious problem of potential misspecification of the model due to the 
inability of considering all the relevant determinants of non-compliance. Finally, we also 
control for the influence of illegal production (considering crimes like drug dealing and 
prostitution), which represents a significant component of total cash payments and – jointly 
with shadow economy – contributes to the larger aggregate of non-observed economy (OECD, 
2002). We then apply this ‘modified CDA’ to Italy, a country where the size of the underground 
economy is remarkable compared to other Western countries. The use of panel data for Italian 
provinces observed over the period 2005-2008 allows us to provide sub-national estimates of the 
                                               
1 Among the more recent contributions on this method, see Ahumada et al. (2007, 2008) and Ferwerda et al. (2010). 
two components of non-observed economy. To the best of our knowledge, this represents a 
further novelty of this work with respect to most of the current literature.2 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief summary of the 
traditional CDA, and a discussion of the methodological innovations we introduce to reinterpret 
the traditional approach, showing how these help overcome (most of) the drawbacks 
highlighted by Schneider and Enste (2000, 2002). Section 3 deals with the theoretical 
considerations supporting our empirical model, introducing the key hypotheses to be tested in 
the estimations. In section 4 we present the application of our ‘modified CDA’ to Italy, 
discussing model specification and empirical results. We also propose a number of robustness 
checks to control whether our results are sensible to alternative model specifications. Besides 
country level estimates, we provide also disaggregated territorial estimates for country macro-
areas. Section 5 contains brief concluding remarks. 
2. Reinterpreting the traditional Currency Demand Approach 
Following the classification used in Schneider (2010a, 2011), three main methodology have been 
applied so far by researchers for the measurement of the shadow economy: 1) direct micro level 
procedures, such as surveys on firms and households3; 2) indirect macro level procedures making 
use of aggregate data retrieved from national accounts, such as the CDA; 3) models that use 
statistical tools to estimate the shadow economy as an ‘unobserved’ variable, such as the 
Multiple-Indicators-Multiple-Causes (MIMIC) model4. 
The CDA is by far the most popular within the above mentioned methodologies, carried out 
making a number of restrictive hypothesis though. Section 2.1 summarises the empirical 
strategy of the traditional CDA and, provided that our empirical analysis concerns the Italian 
provinces, briefly review the main studies aimed at estimating the size of the shadow economy 
in Italy by using the CDA method. Sections 2.2 discusses in detail the innovations of our 
methodology as compared to the traditional CDA. 
                                               
2 Buehn (2012) propose disaggregated territorial estimates for German districts, but the work is limited to shadow 
economy and neglects the role played by illegal production. 
3 Direct micro methods use surveys either on firms or households aiming to assess the size of shadow economy in 
specific sectors and/or specific categories of tax payers. For an exhaustive discussion on advantages and limits, see 
Mogensen et al. (1995). 
4 The MIMIC assumes that the shadow economy remains an unobserved phenomenon (latent variable) whose 
causes and effects are observable but not directly measured. The MIMIC procedure produces only a ranking of the 
size and the development of the shadow economy, which implies the adoption of other methods in order to convert 
the relative index into estimates in percentage of official GDP. In particular, the CDA is used to calibrate the 
relative estimates into absolute ones. For further details on this estimation method, see Frey and Weck-
Hannemann (1984), Giles (1999), Schneider e Enste (2002), Pickhardt and Sarda Pons (2006), Buehn et al. (2009), 
Schneider (2010a, 2011), Pickhardt and Sarda (2011) and Buehn and Schneider (2012). 
2.1. The CDA in a nutshell 
The CDA measures the size of the shadow economy in two stages: 1) the econometric estimation 
of an aggregate money demand equation, with a specific component related to cash transactions 
in the underground sector; 2) the computation of the value of these shadow transactions via the 
quantity theory of money. The key assumptions for the first-stage estimation are that shadow 
transactions are settled in cash to avoid traceability, and that the main cause of the 
underground economy is a high tax burden. The CDA involves estimating the aggregate cash 
demand including among the regressors both standard explanatory variables of the preference 
for liquidity (like the interest rate on deposits) and specific variables identifying the 
determinants of the shadow economy (like the tax burden level). The demand for cash 
associated with shadow transactions is then computed as the difference between the estimated 
demand for cash in the full model and the demand obtained by setting to zero all the 
determinants of the underground economy (i.e., the demand for cash motivated only by regular 
transactions). 
For instance, in the Tanzi (1980, 1983) application of the CDA to the U.S. economy, the 
dependent variable in the money demand equation is the cash to money supply ratio (a proxy 
for the stock of liquid assets M in the Fisher equation). This ratio is regressed on three variables 
identifying the determinants of money demand for regular transactions (the share of wages paid 
in cash on the national income, the interest rate on savings deposits, and the average income per 
capita), plus the average tax rate on personal income, which is considered to be the sole 
determinant of the shadow transactions. Since a basic assumption of the CDA is that a higher 
tax burden stimulates a higher evasion, which in turn causes an increase in the demand for cash, 
the expected sign on the income tax rate is positive5. First stage estimation of the money 
demand equation confirms this view. In the second stage, the estimate of the underground 
economy to GDP is obtained by exploiting the Fisher equation M×V = P×T, where M is the 
money supply (i.e., the stock of liquid assets available in the economy at a specific time), V is 
the velocity of money, and the right-hand side is the value of total transactions in goods and 
services. Since P×T is unknown, the implementation of the Fisher equation requires to assume 
that the values of total transactions in goods and services is proxied by nominal GDP. Then, 
defining a base year in which the contribution of the underground economy to GDP is assumed 
                                               
5 Notice that this introduces a causality issue in the traditional CDA, which is the source of further econometric 
critiques to this methodology (e.g., Breusch, 2005a,b). As will be discussed below, our re-interpretation reduces the 
CDA to a decomposition exercise in the spirit of, e.g., Wagstaff et al. (2003), hence avoiding also these technical 
problems. 
to be zero, the velocity of money V is computed as the ratio between the official GDP and the 
stock of liquid assets. Assuming then that this velocity is the same for the regular economy and 
the shadow sector, the value of the latter is obtained by multiplying V for the estimated ‘excess 
demand’ for cash. 
Although the issue is of great concern for policy makers, there is a scant number of empirical 
studies on the size and the development of shadow economy in Italy. The official figures are 
delivered by the Italian National Statistical Office (ISTAT). In particular, the estimates of 
employment and value added generated by the shadow economy are obtained by applying the 
so called ‘labour input method’ pioneered by the ISTAT itself in the 1980s6. The shadow 
economy is defined as that part of non-observed economy related to the legal production of 
goods and services hidden to Tax Authorities (ISTAT, 2010: 1). The exclusion of illegal 
economy from official figures is motivated by the difficulties and the resulting uncertainty of 
the estimate, which would make data from various countries little comparable. The latest figures 
are available for the period 2000-2008. The value added produced in the underground economy 
is estimated to be in 2008 between a minimum of 16.3% (approximately 255 billion euros) and a 
maximum of 17.5% of GDP (about 275 billion euros). Overall, shadow activities seem to show a 
somewhat countercyclical pattern, with peaks reached in 2001 and 2008. 
According to the results delivered by Schneider and Enste (2000, 2002) – perhaps the most 
known CDA studies delivering results for Italy – the shadow economy represents more than 
one-fourth of the officially measured GDP (above 25% from mid-90s until 2000). More recent 
estimates obtained with the MIMIC approach provided by Buehn and Schneider (2012) are in 
line with these figures, showing a share of the shadow economy out of total GDP around 27% 
over the period 2000-2007. A general weakness of both studies rests in neglecting the issue of 
illegal production.  
This weakness has been discussed by Zizza (2002), who estimates the size and the evolution of 
the shadow economy in Italy, by introducing a variable that explicitly controls for the impact 
of criminal activities on the demand for cash payments among the regressors of the standard 
CDA approach à la Tanzi. Using a relatively small number of observations (68; 1984-2000 
quarterly data), the aggregate money demand equation is estimated by regressing the currency-
to-GDP ratio on a measure of tax pressure (the sole determinant of the shadow economy), the 
                                               
6 As summarized by OECD (2002), the methods entails: 1) estimate the labour input underlying GDP estimates; 2) 
estimate the labour input based on household survey data; 3) convert the enterprise based (demand) and household 
based (supply) estimates of labour input into the same units of labour input; 4) compare the two sets of estimates. 
A surplus of labour input derived from the household source over that from the enterprise source is an indication of 
non-observed production.  
interest rate and an indicator of crime. The tax burden measure is given by the ratio of the sum 
of direct taxes and social security contributions to GDP. The crime indicator is given by the 
share of thefts and robberies out of the total number of reported crimes. The author argues that 
her results are consistent with the official figures provided by ISTAT for the same years once 
one excludes the demand for cash linked to criminal activities (14-17%). This is an important 
point, since it suggests that not accounting for cash used in illegal activities can actually bias 
the estimates of the shadow economy. However, as we argue below, the indicator of crime based 
on the diffusion of thefts and robberies may not satisfactorily account for the use of cash in 
illegal transactions. Other indicators, together with a re-interpretation of the traditional CDA, 
are better suited to obtain more precise estimates of the underground economy. 
2.2. Reinterpreting the CDA 
The starting point of our reinterpretation of the CDA are the criticisms to most of the 
assumptions of the traditional CDA advanced by Schneider and Enste (2000, 2002). In 
particular, we focus here on three main issues: (1) the hypothesis of the absence of any 
transactions in the underground economy in a given base year, which is rather unrealistic; (2) 
the assumption of equality in the velocity of money for both the official and the irregular 
economy, which introduces a restriction in the estimation method not easily justifiable; (3) the 
hypothesis of the excessive tax burden as the only determinant of the shadow economy, which 
is also quite restrictive, since other factors – such as market regulation (especially the regulation 
of labour markets), the trust in political institutions, and the citizens’ tax morale – can 
substantially affect the decision to participate in the underground sector. 
To avoid these critiques, in this study we introduce three innovations as compared to the 
traditional CDA à la Tanzi. First, instead of using the stock of liquid assets as the dependent 
variable in the money demand equation (M), here we take the flow of cash withdrawn from 
bank accounts with respect to total payments settled by instruments other than cash as a direct 
measure of cash transactions (M×V). This is a substantial modification of the model, which 
eliminates the need to make restrictive assumptions on the velocity of money V, hence allows us 
to avoid the correction recently proposed by Ahumada et al. (2007). In particular, we are able to 
overcome the critique (1), concerning the need to arbitrarily choose a base year for calculating 
the velocity of money, and the critique (2), concerning the equality assumption of the velocity 
of money in both the official economy and the shadow sector. Another important point to be 
made concerns the variation over time in the velocity of money, which has apparently slowed 
down in recent years. Notice that the cash withdrawals we refer to also help to deal with the 
problematic measurement of the stock of liquid assets in each country of the EMU zone after 
the introduction of the euro, which can severely limit the application of the traditional CDA for 
countries in this area. A detailed discussion on the empirical merits of our direct measure of cash 
transactions with respect to the traditional money supply measures, together with some 
descriptive statistics, is in Appendix 1. 
Second, in order to reply to critique (3), direct measures of detected tax evasion are included 
among the factors (positively) correlated with the amount of irregular transactions settled in 
cash. In this way, we remove the need to identify a set of variables that can adequately capture 
all the relevant determinants of shadow economy besides the level of tax burden, which is the 
key variable in the classic Tanzi-approach. Other factors (like, for instance, market regulation 
and tax morale) may indeed affect the decisions of noncompliance (see, e.g., Ferwerda et al., 
2010; Schneider, 2010a, 2011; Buehn and Schneider, 2012). Looking directly at the final outcome 
of this process, we can circumvent the problem of an incomplete specification of the model 
resulting in biased estimates. Notice that the choice of considering detected evasion also shifts 
the interpretation of the model from a causal approach to a more simple decomposition exercise: 
in the traditional CDA, a higher tax burden causes a higher tax evasion; in our re-interpretation, 
a higher detected evasion would be simply associated with larger withdrawals of cash. 
Finally, with reference again to criticism (3) and the issue of model misspecification, we argue 
that shadow economy accounts for just one component of the total amount of cash payments. 
Indeed, according to OECD (2002) classification, the activities contributing most to the so-
called non-observed (cash-settled) economy in developed countries include both underground 
and illegal production: the former is defined as «those activities that are productive and legal 
but are deliberately concealed from the public authorities to avoid payment of taxes or 
complying with regulations», while the latter mainly refers to «the production of goods and 
services whose production, sale or mere possession is forbidden by law». Hence, in order to avoid 
potential distortions in the estimation of the underground component of non-observed 
economy, the reinterpretation we propose also controls for the presence of illegal production. 
We consider, in particular, two criminal activities like drug dealing and prostitution, which 
represent illegal transactions typically regulated in cash and are classified by almost all scholars 
among the most important activities making up the illegal economy. Notice that the choices of 
the individuals operating in the two sectors of non-observed economy (underground and illegal 
production) depend on different motivations and incentive mechanisms, including the role 
played by deterrence actions. The two components also differ remarkably for their effects on 
public finances and the implications in terms of law enforcement policies, since it is possible to 
identify potential revenues to be recovered through tax audits only for shadow economy, while 
in the case of illegal production the goal is to suppress the criminal activity by relying on 
policing and imprisonment. Despite these relevant differences, the decomposition of total non-
observed economy into underground and illegal production is an issue rarely investigated in the 
literature, mainly because of the difficulty in delineating the boundaries of the analysis and the 
lack of reliable information.  Here we exploit crime indicators related to drug dealing and 
prostitution, with the purpose to provide a more precise estimate of the excess demand of cash 
transactions due to tax evasion, by disentangling the illegal component of non-observed 
economy and thus introducing a third innovation with respect to the traditional CDA. 
3. An application of the ‘modified CDA’: theoretical framework 
Our assessment of the size of the shadow economy is based on the estimation of a model of 
demand for cash payments where the dependent variable is a direct measure of the value of 
transactions at the provincial level. In particular, the dependent variable in the estimated 
equation is the ratio of the value of cash withdrawn from bank accounts to the value of total 
payments settled by instruments other than cash (CASH). This represents a measure of the 
demand for untraced payments per euro of traceable ones (i.e., payments settled by bank 
transfers, cheques, credit cards). 
In line with the discussion in Section 2, we classify the determinants of CASH in three groups, 
thus identifying three components of the demand for cash payments: the structural component, 
the underground (or tax evasion) component, and the illegal (or crime) component. In the 
following – in line with, e.g., Torgler and Schneider (2009), Buehn and Schneider (2012) – we 
present our methodological approach by formulating testable hypotheses on the variables 
affecting each of the three mentioned components. Appendix 2 reports descriptive statistics for 
all covariates and information on data sources (see Tables A2 and A3). 
3.1. The structural component of the demand for cash payments 
We identify four factors related to the structural demand for cash payments: the degree of local 
socio-economic development; the degree of spatial diffusion of banking activities; the 
technology of  payments; and the  interest rate.  
The level of development of the economy is measured by per capita GDP at the provincial level 
(YPC). As suggested by several studies on shadow economy (e.g., Schneider and Enste, 2000; 
Schneider, 2011; Buehn and Schneider, 2012), per capita GDP has a negative expected impact 
on the use of cash: the higher the average living standard, the lower is the use of cash for 
payments (and the higher the demand for alternative payment instruments). The average 
income is highly correlated with education level (both general education and “financial 
literacy”), and more education usually leads to a lower use of cash, since more educated 
individuals show greater confidence in alternative payment instruments (World Bank, 2005; 
Ferwerda et al., 2010). Accordingly, the related hypothesis to be tested is the following. 
H1: The higher the average per capita income in a province, the lower is the structural (legal) demand 
for cash payments, ceteris paribus. 
We also consider the rate of unemployment at the provincial level (URATE) as a second 
possible indicator for the level of economic development.7 In particular, to some extent this 
variable reflects differences in income distribution (see, e.g., Brandolini et al., 2004), thus in 
educational levels, and is expected to exert a positive impact on the use of cash for payments. 
For a given average value of per capita GDP, a higher unemployment rate corresponds to a 
more concentrated distribution of income favouring the rich, hence with a larger share of low-
income (and poorly educated) people relying on the use of cash for their payments. We then 
formulate the following hypothesis: 
H2: The higher the unemployment rate of a province, the higher is the structural (legal) demand for 
cash payments, ceteris paribus. 
The number of per capita bank accounts (BANK) is included in the estimated equation as a 
proxy of the spatial diffusion of banking activities, thus controlling for the structural impact of 
the degree of bank branches concentration in provincial economies on the demand for cash 
payments. The expected sign of BANK coefficient is negative, as a higher presence of current 
accounts reduces the need to withdraw cash from ATMs for payments. Thus, the hypothesis to 
be tested is the following: 
H3: The higher the presence of banking activities in a province, the lower is the structural (legal) 
demand for cash payments, ceteris paribus. 
Several studies (e.g., Drehmann and Goodhart, 2000; Goodhart and Krueger, 2001; Schneider, 
2009) emphasize the importance of the technology of payments, with a particular reference to 
                                               
7 We acknowledge an anonymous referee for pointing out this additional control.   
the supply of electronic instruments. We account for available technology by including the 
variable ELECTRO among the structural determinants of CASH. This measures the ratio of 
the value of transactions settled by electronic payments to provincial GDP. Since a higher share 
of electronic transactions (via POS and internet banking) implies a lower number of cash 
transactions, the expected sign of the ELECTRO coefficient is negative. Thus, we put forward 
the following hypothesis: 
H4: The higher the diffusion of electronic payments in commercial transactions, the lower is the 
structural (legal) demand for cash payments, ceteris paribus. 
The interest rate on bank deposits (INT) is the fourth factor of the structural component of 
CASH. Based on standard economic theory, the interest rate is expected to have a negative 
effect on the demand for money, via its role of opportunity cost of holding cash in alternative to 
interest-bearing assets. Notice, however, that our model deals with cash flows rather than 
stocks of liquid assets, which implies an ambiguous effect of the interest rate.8 Higher interest 
rates might even have a positive impact on flows, for instance, by pushing towards forms of 
cash raising alternative to the banking channel. However, due to the usual ‘speculative’ motive, 
we can not exclude that the interest rate on bank deposits may also negatively affect the 
propensity to withdraw cash in alternative to the use of other payment instruments. Thus, the 
expected sign of the INT coefficient is a priori unclear and we do not formulate testable 
hypothesis. 
3.2. The underground component of the demand for cash payments  
We reinterpret the traditional CDA by considering measures of detected tax evasion instead of 
the variables usually adopted as proxies for the tax burden level, like the average income tax 
rate. Information on detected tax evasion are retrieved from a dataset concerning inspection 
activities with law enforcement purposes by the Guardia di Finanza (the Italian tax police). The 
availability of such information is particularly relevant for two reasons. First, as already 
discussed above, many factors – beyond the burden of taxes and social security contributions – 
are likely to influence the decision to escape Tax Authorities (market regulation, tax morale of 
citizens, efficiency of public administration, etc.), and each of these factors would need a proper 
                                               
8 Several studies investigating the role of innovative payment systems in cash demand of Italian families (e.g., 
Ardizzi and Tresoldi, 2003; Lippi and Secchi, 2008; Alvarez and Lippi, 2009) point out that the progress in 
transaction technology may substantially reduce (or even eliminate) the impact of interest rate on cash demand of 
buyers. 
proxy.9 Second, tax rates might be subject to a reverse causality argument: for a given amount of 
public spending, in a country with a higher tax evasion, statutory tax rates need to be set at an 
higher level to keep the budget balanced (see, e.g., Breusch, 2005a, b). Third, to explore within-
country variations in the shadow economy, one needs specific tax rates for each sub-area, which 
can be difficult to obtain in presence of even a minimal degree of tax decentralization and a 
number of layers of government. For instance, this is the case in Italy, where there are no data 
on the actual tax rate at the provincial level, and the calculation of some proxies for “fiscal 
pressure” is not a trivial task, since taxes are levied by different levels of government (including 
municipalities, provinces and regions) on very different tax bases. 
In order to overcome these problems, we selected two variables that provide a direct measure of 
the diffusion of the productive activities (partially or totally) unknown to Tax Authorities at 
the provincial level. EVAS1 is defined by the number of specific tax audits10 in a given province 
divided by its sample mean (this is a measure of tax evasion intensity at the provincial level), 
and then weighed by a GDP concentration index.11 This latter standardization allows us to 
compare provinces characterized by remarkable differences in the level of economic 
development, thus avoiding attaching automatically higher levels of tax evasion to provinces 
with a number of audits above the sample mean. 
The second variable (EVAS2) accounts for irregularities detected by the Guardia di Finanza 
during inspections to retailers. EVAS2 is computed as the ratio of the number of positive audits 
on cash registers and tax receipts to the number of existing POS in the province.12 The 
standardization for the number of POS is made necessary by the high variability in the presence 
of POS across provinces, which is likely to affect the opportunity to evade.13 The inclusion of 
both EVAS1 and EVAS2 in our model is motivated by the fact that the former refers to 
                                               
9 For a discussion on the determinants of the decision to participate in the shadow economy, besides tax burden, 
see, among others, Friedman et al. (2000), Schneider and Enste (2000, 2002), Feld and Frey (2007), Dreher et al. 
(2009), Torgler and Schneider (2009), Dreher and Schneider (2010), Schneider (2010a) and Buehn and Schneider 
(2012). 
10 These audits are specific in the sense that they imply inspections to firms based on ex-ante information about 
frauds that occurred within a particular operation (e.g., payment of salaries) and/or are related to a single item of 
the tax base (e.g., income taxes or social security contributions). 
11 The GDP concentration index is defined as the ratio of provincial GDP to its sample mean value. 
12  Here positive stands for audits with detected evasion. The ratio is weighed for the GDP concentration index for 
the same reasons discussed above. 
13 The availability of POS can significantly affect the likelihood to evade taxes. Retailers are obliged to accept a 
payment with a credit/debit card when a customer exhibits one and a POS is available, and this makes more 
difficult to evade taxes because the payment is traced. Thus, dividing the number of positive tax audits by the 
number of POS in the province allows us to weight the detected irregularities for the actual opportunities to evade 
(smaller where the number of POS is higher), and to obtain a more precise indicator of the diffusion of evasion: for 
a given number of POS, the higher the number of positive tax audits, the greater will be the underlying propensity 
to adopt non-compliant behaviours. 
inspections which may relate to any assumed fiscal irregularity (evasion of income and indirect 
taxes or social security contributions) in any type of business, while the latter certainly detects 
only tax frauds in sales by retailers (VAT and income tax evasion). Thus, EVAS1 and EVAS2 
are expected to jointly provide a more comprehensive evaluation of the underground 
component in the demand for cash payments. Thus, the hypothesis to be tested is the following: 
H5: The higher the value of EVAS1 and EVAS2, the higher is the demand for cash payments in the 
shadow economy, ceteris paribus. 
3.3. The illegal component of the demand for cash payments 
An index of crime diffusion (CRIME) is included as a further innovation compared to the 
traditional CDA, in order to separate the illegal component of non-observed (cash-settled) 
economy from shadow production14. CRIME is defined as the share of crimes violating the laws 
on drugs and prostitution over the total number of reported crimes in each province. In analogy 
with tax evasion variables, also this indicator has been weighted by a GDP concentration index. 
The normalization for the total number of crimes accounts for differences in crime specialization 
across provinces, which affect the use of cash: a province where we observe only crimes 
involving the use of cash is different from a province where crime is widespread, but only a 
small fraction of these crimes are related to the use of cash. The standardization using GDP is 
instead able to account for differences in the enforcement activity (hence, in detected crimes), 
which are reasonably guided by the level of economic development. 
The selection of variables to estimate the size of the illegal production deserves a brief 
explanation. Our choice of drug- and prostitution-related offenses is motivated by the focus on 
criminal activities that – in line with the OECD (2002) definition of illegal economy discussed 
above – imply an exchange between a seller and a buyer relying on a mutual agreement and a 
voluntary cash payment. Therefore, we excluded all those crimes which, to some extent, are 
based on the use of violence made to persons or properties (burglary, extortion, etc), and then 
imply ‘transfers of money’ which do not follow an ‘agreement’ between the thief, for instance, 
and the victim.15 We also excluded those offences with possible ambiguous effects on the size of 
                                               
14 To the best of our knowledge, the unique previous attempt to account for the presence of criminal activities in 
the Italian context is provided by Zizza (2002). However, for the reasons discussed here, the crime indicator used in 
Zizza (2002) is inadequate to capture the excess demand for cash payments due to illegal production.  
15 We do not account for money laundering in our analysis, since this is a criminal offense which results from other 
underlying criminal activities that amplifies in a cumulative way the impact of organized crime on both regular 
and irregular economies. The definition of recycling implies that the income stemming from a crime needs to be 
‘cleaned up’ through the legal channel (e.g., bank transactions) in order to lower the likelihood for the criminal 
cash withdrawals. This is, for instance, the case of thefts, which could also have a negative 
impact on CASH due to the fact that – in areas where more robberies occur – individuals will 
find too dangerous to hold money in cash. In essence, our choice is consistent with the model to 
be estimated, which exploits information on cash withdrawals from bank accounts due to a 
voluntary transactional motive. The hypothesis to be tested is then: 
H6: The higher the value of CRIME, the higher is the demand for cash payments in the illegal 
economy, ceteris paribus. 
3.4. The complete ‘modified CDA’ model 
Equation [1] sums up the previous theoretical discussion, providing the complete model of the 
demand for cash payments to be estimated. We consider the three groups of variables discussed 
above, identifying the structural demand for cash reflecting the ordinary preference for 













Once obtained the parameter estimates of the model, we adapt and apply the original procedure 
proposed by Tanzi (1983) for the assessment of the underground economy. The size of the total 
(shadow plus illegal) non-observed production is given by the ‘excess demand’ for cash 
payments unexplained by structural factors. This excess demand is obtained as the difference 
between the fitted values of CASH from the full model [1], and predicted values obtained from 
a restricted version of Equation [1] setting EVAS1 = EVAS2 = CRIME = 0. To evaluate 
separately the size of the two components of the non-observed economy, we then proceed in a 
similar manner, by imposing alternatively the restrictions EVAS1 = EVAS2 = 0 and CRIME 
= 0, and calculating the excess demand for cash payments due to tax evasion (underground 
production) and criminal activities (illegal production), respectively. Given our definition of 
CASH, the estimates obtained in this way are expressed in relation to total payments settled by 
instruments other than cash. In order to have measures comparable with previous studies, we 
then rescale our estimates of shadow and illegal economy, and express our results in terms of 
provincial GDP. 
                                                                                                                                                            
agent of being caught. After this, the ‘cleaned up’ money can be reinvested in legal activities (see, e.g., Schneider 
and Windischbauer, 2008, and Schneider, 2010b). 
4. Econometric analysis 
4.1. Baseline model specifications 
To illustrate our ‘modified CDA’, we depart from the existing literature on Italy, which has so 
far dealt with country-level data, and apply model [1] to a balanced panel of 91 Italian 
provinces observed from 2005 to 2008. The units included in the sample represent about 90% of 
all the Italian provinces (103), and are those for which complete information were available for 
all the variables included in Equation [1]. 
Given the panel structure of the database and the distribution of our dependent variable, we use 
a Random Effects Tobit model to account for unobserved residual heterogeneity across 
provinces. This model has the advantage – as compared to a standard panel regression with 
individual random effects – to accommodate for the particular distribution of the dependent 
variable, which is censored at zero and can assume only positive values16. In particular, we 
specify the error structure of Equation [1] as εit = ui + eit, where u and e are provincial effects 
and the standard disturbance term, respectively. 
Our baseline specifications are in Table 1. With respect to Equation [1], MODEL A and B do not 
consider the unemployment rate, which is included in models C and D. More important, MODEL A 
and C accounts only for the underground production as a component of the non-observed 
economy, while MODEL B and D consider both tax evasion and criminal activities, including the 
variable CRIME. Estimates are pretty much consistent across the four specifications, and 
coefficients show up the expected signs and are statistically significant at the usual confidence 
levels. For all the four specifications, the coefficient ρ – which measures the proportion of total 
residual variance explained by individual effects (u) in relation to the proportion explained by 
noise (e) – is about 0.80, highlighting the importance of using panel techniques, in order to 
control for the presence of unobserved heterogeneity due to provincial-specific idiosyncratic 
random shocks. 
The inclusion of URATE as a further control for the structural demand for cash reduces the 
magnitude of the per capita GDP, taking up a positive sign. As expected, the unemployment 
rate also interacts with the components of the underground economy (especially with the 
activity of retailers, which often make use of irregular workers), allowing for a better 
identification of the contribution of each to the demand for cash. In particular, while the 
                                               
16 See, e.g., Wooldridge (2002). Notice that the theoretical distribution of CASH is between 0, if all transactions are 
carried out using payment methods different from cash, to infinity, if all transactions are carried out using cash. 
magnitude of the coefficient for EVAS1 is substantially unchanged when including URATE in 
the model, EVAS2 increases from 0.010 to 0.018 (MODEL B vs. MODEL D). 
Moreover, estimates in Table 1 confirms the importance of controlling for the presence of illegal 
activities (drug dealing and prostitution) in order to correctly assess the extent of the 
underground economy. In fact, as suggested by LR tests (MODEL A vs. MODEL D, p-value = 
0.002; MODEL C vs. MODEL D, p-value = 0.003), the inclusion of CRIME significantly improves 
the goodness of fit of the model. It also reduces the magnitude of the coefficients associated to 
EVAS2 (especially when we do not account for URATE, a7 = 0.027 vs. 0.010) and EVAS1 
(when URATE is included, a6 = 0.009 vs. 0.006), thus lowering the total impact of tax evasion 
on the demand for cash and, eventually, the estimated size of the shadow production. 
Interestingly, considering illegal activities also impacts on the structural component of the 
demand for cash, reducing coefficients for YPC and URATE, and doubling the one of BANK. 
Though discomforting, a likely interpretation is that the level of economic development could 
be (positively) associated to the demand of ‘criminal services’. 
Before moving further notice that the pattern of these results is broadly confirmed when 
substituting the Tobit model with an alternative Random Effects GLS specification, allowing 
for robust standard errors clustered at the provincial level (see Appendix 2, Table A4). Hence, 
one might expect that also the size of the non-observed economy will not be affected by the 
choice of a particular model to estimate the demand for cash. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Table 2 provides the average size of the non-observed economy derived from all the four models 
in Table 1. The values has been obtained by first computing for each province in each year 
separate measures for the underground economy and the illegal production (when possible), and 
then identifying outliers using the Hadi (1992, 1994) method before calculating the averages. 
Interesting results emerge from the table. First, our estimates emphasise the need to control for 
cash used in criminal transactions in order to obtain a better representation of the underground 
economy. Indeed, when controlling also for criminal activities as a component of the demand for 
cash, the estimated size of the non-observed economy due to tax evasion (between 16.5% and 
17.5% of GDP over the entire period 2005-2008) is very close to the official figures provided by 
the Italian National Institute of Statistics (Istat, 2010), while, e.g.,  Schneider and Enste (2000, 
2002) and Buehn and Schneider (2012) report much higher values (above 25% from mid-90s 
until 2000 and stably around 27% from 2000 until 2007). As already suggested by Zizza (2002), 
this discrepancy is likely to be attributable to the role played by criminal activities. Indeed, the 
ratio of the illegal production ‘value added’ to GDP in 2007 is in line with the only available 
estimates provided by Eurispes (2008) for the same year (about 11% of GDP). The estimates of 
MODEL A and C – where the crime indicator is not included – confirms that neglecting the 
component of illegal economy in the application of the CDA leads to an overestimation of the 
underground production. For instance, MODEL C implies a higher value of the underground 
economy than MODEL D, 26.1% vs. 17.5% on average in 2005-2008. Notice that this value is also 
slightly lower than the sum of the shadow economy and the illegal production estimated in 
MODEL D (27.5%). Hence, ignoring crime as a component of total cash payments brings about 
two possible measurement errors: on the one side, it muddles up tax evasion and illegal 
production; on the other side, it brings to underestimate the total size of the non-observed 
economy. Notice that these results hold even when using the Random Effects GLS model (Table 
3). Looking at the more complete MODEL D, the estimated average size of the total non-observed 
economy is 28.6% of GDP in 2005-2008, which is pretty close to estimates obtained with the 
Tobit model (27.5%). Also the decomposition is similar: in both cases, about 1/3 is attributable 
to crime, and the remaining 2/3 make up the underground economy. 
Second, confirming previous studies (e.g., Loayza and Rigolini, 2011, Fiess et al., 2010), the 
temporal dynamics of both components for all the four models suggests a link between non-
observed economy and the economic cycle. For instance, considering the more complete MODEL 
D in Table 2, one can observe an increasing trend from 2005 to 2008 for both components, 
although the increase appears more marked for tax evasion (+5.1%) than for the criminal 
economy (+2.3%), with a sharp jump in the transition from 2006 to 2007 (+3.4% and +1.5%, 
respectively). Again, also these trends are confirmed when estimating the demand for cash with 
a Random Effects GLS model: from Table 3, the increase for tax evasion (+4.2%) is larger than 
for the illegal component of the demand for money (+2.1%), with much of the variation 
concentrated between 2006 and 2007. Such evidence may be, at least in part, due to the fact 
that the Italian economy in 2007, like other countries in the euro zone, began to suffer the 
cyclical downturn caused by the severe world financial crisis, with a sharp slowdown in 
consumptions and investments and a strong deterioration in firms’ trust indicators (Bank of 
Italy, 2007). The negative expectations of the operators may then have led to an increased 
subtraction of taxable income to Fiscal Authorities, and a more marked use of the black labour 
market, and/or even to turn to illegal sectors of the economy (e.g., prostitution, drug dealing).17 
The anti-cyclical behaviour of the non-observed economy might suggest a change in the 
relationship between structural variables, the indicators for underground economy and crime, 
and the demand for cash. We then checked the stability of the parameters in our model by 
defining the dummy variable T2 equal to 1 for the years 2007-2008, and interacting this dummy 
with all the variables included in Equation [1]. The estimates of this augmented model (using 
both the Tobit and GLS specifications) are in Table A5 in Appendix 2. All the interactions and 
the coefficient for T2 itself turn out to be statistically insignificant. Unsurprisingly, a Wald test 
for the hypothesis that all interactions and the T2 coefficient are jointly insignificant does not 
reject the null.18 We then take the more complete MODEL D and the derived estimates of the 
non-observed economy as our baseline results, and check their robustness in a number of 
directions in what follows. 
 
[Tables 2 and 3 about here] 
 
4.2. Robustness checks 
In this section we consider three robustness checks for our findings. A first robustness check is 
related to the clustering of illegal activities in certain areas. In particular, a well-known stylized 
fact is that crime rates are higher in large cities than in other urban contexts. One explanation 
of why it is so – pointed out by Glaeser and Sacerdote (1999) – is that pecuniary benefits for 
crime are larger in large cities as compared to small cities or rural villages. One may then 
wonder how robust our results are to the presence in our sample of provinces characterized by 
large urban centers, like Rome or Milan, with 2.7 million and 1.3 million citizens respectively. 
To test for this we use jackknifing, and re-estimate the more complete MODEL D both with the 
Random Effects Tobit specification and the Random Effects GLS specification, leaving out 
from the sample three subsets of observations: subset 1 considers the three provinces with the 
largest cities in the Centre-North (Rome, Milan and Turin); subset 2 considers the three 
                                               
17 Notice that these changes in the economic cycle involve likely variations in the velocity of money, which 
presumably fell in the official economy and increased in the irregular sectors. This further supports the adoption of 
an estimation approach – such as the ‘modified CDA’ proposed here – that overcomes the restriction of the velocity 
of money constant over time and identical between regular and non-observed economy. 
18 The p-value of the c2 statistic is 0.170 in the Random Effects Tobit model and 0.153 in the Random Effects GLS 
model. 
provinces with the largest cities in the South (Bari, Naples and Palermo); subset 3 considers 
jointly the two previous groups. Estimates of these models are in Tables A6-A8 in Appendix 2. 
The signs, the magnitudes, and the statistical significance of almost all coefficients are largely 
confirmed. We only observe some minor changes in the magnitudes for coefficients of YPC, 
URATE and EVAS2 when excluding from the sample the three Southern provinces. In 
particular, the (negative) impact of income becomes larger, while that of unemployment and 
that of tax frauds in sales by retailers approximately halve, likely because these three Southern 
provinces are also those with the highest per capita income within the Southern regions. More 
important, estimates of the size of non-observed economy and the relative weights of the 
underground economy and the illegal production are also broadly confirmed. For instance, from 
Table 4, considering the Tobit specification, the average size of non-observed economy to be 
compared with the initial estimates of 27.5% in MODEL D is: 28% excluding the three Center-
North provinces; 27.6% excluding those in the South; 28.4% excluding both. 
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
A second issue that might threaten the robustness of our findings is the use of GDP 
concentration index to standardize our indicators of tax evasion EVAS1 and EVAS2 and the 
indicator for criminal activities CRIME. While the standardization itself is needed to compare 
provinces characterized by remarkable differences in the level of economic development (which 
can then imply a higher number of audits and inspections to fight crime in the richer areas), the 
use of income can bias the estimates since it is directly related to the use of cash and – more 
important – it includes an estimate of the shadow economy (Istat, 2010). We then re-estimate 
our previous MODEL D standardizing EVAS1, EVAS2 and CRIME with an employment 
concentration index, which accounts for differences in economic development but it does not 
suffer the two drawbacks mentioned before. Estimates of this new model, both with the Tobit 
and GLS specifications, are in Table A9 in Appendix 2. As before, the signs, the magnitudes, 
and the statistical significance of almost all coefficients are basically confirmed. From Table 5, 
also the size and the evolution of the non-observed economy, and the relative weights of 
underground and illegal production, are broadly similar to our baseline estimates. Considering 
the Tobit specification, the average total non-observed economy is now 30.9% of GDP 
(compared to 27.5% obtained from MODEL D in Table 1), of which 19.7% is related to the 
underground economy and the remaining 11.2% is related to criminal dealings.19 We also 
observe the large jump between 2006 and 2007 discussed above, which probably reflects the 
impact of the cyclical downturn. 
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
Finally, we also check whether our findings are robust to splitting the variable CRIME in its two 
components, drug (DRUG) and prostitution (PROST). Estimates of this additional model, 
considering both Tobit and GLS specifications, are in Table A10 in Appendix 2. Drug related 
offences appear to be the criminal activity driving the results, with a coefficient statistically 
significant and approximately the same magnitude of CRIME in our baseline model. On the 
contrary, coefficient for PROST picks up the expected positive sign, but it is not statistically 
significant at the usual confidence levels.20 Estimates of the size of the non-observed economy 
from this additional model are in Table 6, and pretty much confirm previous findings. 
Considering the Tobit model, the underground economy makes up on average 16.9% of 
provincial GDP. As for the illegal production, drug trafficking is estimated to generate demand 
for cash equivalent to 8.4% of GDP, while prostitution generates only a mere 1.6%. The total 
estimated size of the non-observed economy is 26.9%, quite close to the baseline estimate of 
27.5% of GDP. 
 
[Table 6 about here] 
 
4.3. Within-country disaggregated estimates 
In this section we look at disaggregated territorial estimates of the two components of the non-
observed economy, a particularly interesting issue for the Italian case in the light of the marked 
regional differentials in the distribution of tax bases and in the concentration of the organized 
crime. At least two questions deserve to be explored: first, given the higher degree of economic 
                                               
19 It is worth noticing that the slightly higher values obtained for the two components of non-observed economy 
are likely to be the results of the lower variability in the sample of the number of employed people out of the total 
population compared to GDP per capita (the coefficient of variation is 0.14 for the former variable against 0.24 for 
the latter). This difference reflects the fact that the employment index, differently from GDP, does not reflect the 
variation in the nominal value of production due to the variation in input prices – especially in wages and between 
centre-northern and southern provinces – hence implying a less precise correction of our indicators of detected tax 
evasion and crime for the differences observed in the level of economic development across provinces.  
20 As shown in Table A3 in Appendix 2, this result can be attributed to the fact that – compared to DRUG – 
PROST accounts for a minor share of total crime index (CRIME) and presents a low variability in the sample.  
and industrial development of the Central-Northern provinces with respect to Southern ones, 
does the size of the underground production differ between the North and the South of the 
country? Second, does the prevalent localization of the ‘headquarters’ of criminal organizations 
in the South of Italy imply a higher contribution of the Southern regions to the formation of the 
illegal component of the non-observed economy? Or, instead, is it reasonable to expect minor 
territorial differences, due to the high mobility of criminal resources? 
According to results reported in Table 7, which are derived from estimates of MODEL D in Table 
1 and Table A4, compared to Southern provinces, those in the Centre-North exhibit a higher 
incidence of the non-observed economy on GDP. More important, this larger size is due both to 
a larger tax evasion (19% vs. 14%) and to a larger weight of criminal activities (11.5% vs. 
6.7%). The finding is robust to the choice of the econometric specification (Table 7, Random 
Effects GLS), but also to the use of jackknifing and the exclusion from the sample of the 
provinces with the largest cities in terms of citizens (Table 8). Interestingly, excluding the three 
provinces with the largest Southern cities from the sample brings about a reduction in the 
relative weight of the underground economy, and an increase in the size of illegal production. 
The implication seems to be that – in these Southern provinces – the non-observed economy is 
much more related to the underground production than to criminal activities. We also confirm, 
in Table 9, that the illegal production is mainly due to drug trafficking, which accounts for 
9.6% of GDP in Centre-Northern provinces and 5.9% in Southern ones, as compared to 2% and 
0.9%, respectively, for prostitution. 
 
[Tables 7, 8 and 9 about here] 
 
Despite being against the widespread opinion about the presence of a higher shadow economy 
and illegal production in the South of the country21, such an evidence of a significant gap 
between Centre-North and South supports the results obtained by the few previous studies 
based on alternative estimation methodologies. Relying on time series data from the early ‘80s 
to the late ‘90s, Bovi et al. (2002) estimate a higher tax evasion in the North than in the South 
in several years. More recently, looking at more specific taxes (the Personal Income Tax 
                                               
21 This opinion largely relies on the fact that in Southern regions payments are settled by instruments other than 
cash to a lower extent than in the Centre-North. The descriptive statistics reported in Table A3 in Appendix 2 
clearly show that the use of cash is higher in the South than in the rest of the country (the mean values of CASH 
are 0.09 and 0.15 in the Centre-North and in the South, respectively). However, far from being in contrast with our 
results, these statistics provide evidence that in less advanced regions, because of the lower degree of financial 
development, a higher share of transactions in the official economy are settled in cash.  
IRPEF, and a tax on productive activities IRAP), Marino and Zizza (2008) and Pisani and 
Polito (2006) both conclude that in many cases tax evasion is higher in the Centre-North than 
in the rest of the country. The results delivered in 2011 by the Working Group Economia non 
osservata e flussi finanziari (literally, ‘Non-observed economy and financial flows’) – established 
by the Ministry of Economy and chaired by the President of the Italian Statistical Office – go in 
the same direction. Finally, a recent survey by one of the three biggest unions shows the 
significant increase in the diffusion of irregular workers in the Northern regions (UIL, 2011). As 
for the illegal component of the non-observed economy, the higher incidence observed for the 
Centre-North is probably justified by the fact that the use of cash for transactions related to 
criminal activities is higher where the ‘retail markets’ for goods and services such as drug and 
prostitution are more lucrative. Hence, despite criminal organizations having their 
‘headquarters’ predominantly localized in the South, our evidence seems to suggest their ability 
to export illegal activities in the richest areas of the country.22 
Finally, as Figure 1 makes clear, notice that macro-area averages hide significant differences 
across provinces. It is clear that the size of non-observed economy is smaller in Southern 
provinces than in Centre-Northern ones. But the underground and the illegal production follow 
clustering patterns which are difficult to rationalize at first sight. A likely explanation is that 
these patterns are probably linked to geographical flows of people and goods across provinces in 
different regions. The likely presence of these flows suggests a potential drawback of using 
disaggregated estimates at the provincial level instead of macro-area averages, i.e., the 
possibility that money has been withdrawn in one province to be spent in another one, or even 
abroad.  
5. Conclusions 
In this paper we contribute to the debate on assessing the size of the underground economy by 
providing a reinterpretation of the CDA à la Tanzi, which aims at overcoming its most relevant 
weaknesses as remarked in Scheider and Enste (2000, 2002). Our main contributions can be 
summarized as follows. First, we introduce a direct measure of the value of cash transactions as 
the dependent variable in the money demand equation. In particular, we use the flow of cash 
withdrawn from bank accounts with respect to total noncash payments in substitution of the 
traditional money stock variable. This departure from the standard CDA makes it possible to 
avoid the unrealistic assumptions of the absence of underground production in a given base 
                                               
22 The ability of criminal organizations to ‘export’ their businesses is discussed, e.g., in Varese (2011). 
year, and of a common velocity of money in the official economy and the irregular sector. 
Second, instead of considering a causal model in which the tax burden is the main determinant 
of the decision to operate in the underground economy, we disentangle the ‘excess demand’ for 
cash payments due to tax evasion by exploiting direct information on detected non-compliance, 
thus overcoming the problem of finding suitable proxies able to capture all the relevant causes 
of the phenomenon. Third, we control also for the role played by illegal production (considering 
crimes like drug dealing and prostitution), which – jointly with the shadow economy – 
contributes to the larger aggregate of the non-observed economy and represents a significant 
component of total cash payments.  
We present an application of this ‘modified CDA’ exploiting original data on monetary 
variables, tax evasion and reported illegal activities for the Italian Provinces over the period 
2005-2008. Our baseline results show an average value of the shadow economy of 17.5% of 
GDP, which is consistent with the recent estimates available from official statistical sources 
relying on microeconomic methods of measurement, but appears lower than the values obtained 
for Italy in the international literature (e.g., Schneider and Enste, 2000, 2002 and Buehn and 
Schneider, 2012). We show that this discrepancy is likely to be due to the omission of illegal 
activities in the application of the traditional CDA à la Tanzi. Not surprisingly, when the model 
does not account for the role played by criminal transactions, which amount, on average, to 
about 10% of GDP, our estimate of the underground economy increases up to 26.1% of GDP. 
This evidence is robust to a number of controls which includes: alternative econometric 
specifications; the use of jackknifing and the exclusion from the sample of those provinces with 
the largest cities; the use of different weights to take into account differences in economic 
development, which presumably drive both tax enforcement and law enforcement activities; the 
definition of the crime indicators. A general conclusion stemming from our findings is that, 
ignoring illegal production, one could not only mistakenly attribute to shadow economy the 
part of cash payments due to criminal transactions – for which it is not possible to implement 
enforcement policies in order to recover lost tax revenues – but also underestimate the total 
incidence of the non-observed economy (i.e., underground plus illegal production).  
Given the availability of relevant information at a disaggregated territorial level, we also 
provide estimates of the shadow and illegal economy by macro-areas. This is an important step 
in the understanding of the non-observed economy and its size, because of the marked North-
South divide in the level of economic development, institutional quality and social capital in 
Italy. The evidence we provide suggests that, compared to Southern provinces, those in the 
Centre-North exhibit a higher incidence of both underground economy and illegal production 
relative to GDP. While the result on crime is likely to be related to the ability of criminal 
organizations to ‘export’ illegal activities in the retail markets of the richest areas of the 
country, where demand of drugs and prostitution is presumably higher, the findings concerning 
tax compliance and the clustering of underground production in neighbouring provinces 
stimulate further research on the determinants of this higher propensity to evade in the richest 
Northern part of the country.  
As for the policy implications directed at reducing the size of the non-observed economy that 
can be drawn from our results, the general suggestion will be the introduction of measures that 
make cash more difficult and more costly to use relative to other instruments. Since we observe 
a positive correlation between the use of cash and the non-observed economy, limiting the use of 
cash is likely to limit also the non-observed economy. A measure recently undertaken by the 
Italian government goes exactly in this direction: it provides an upper limit of 1,000 euro for the 
value of cash transactions, and makes compulsory the use of traceable payment methods for all 
transaction above this threshold (see the article 12 of the Law 201/2011, the so-called Law 
“Salva Italia”). A second (somewhat provoking) measure discussed in the political debate is the 
proposal to tax both withdrawals and deposits of cash over a certain threshold. However, the 
tax rate should be high enough to outweigh the economic advantages deriving from tax evasion 
and illegal activities in order to reach the proposed goal of reducing the size of the non-observed 
economy. As the interests at stake are high, the tax will reasonably remain just a proposal. 
Finally, a third group of measures is directed at favouring the use of instruments alternative to 
cash: these include, for instance, incentives for the diffusion of electronic payments, as well as 
public campaigns aimed at modifying the cultural bias toward the use of cash, especially in 
certain areas of the country. It could be difficult, but it seems worth it. 
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Table 1. Estimated demand for cash payments (Random Effects Tobit model – 91 Italian 
provinces, 2005-2008) a  
Regressors b MODEL A MODEL B MODEL C      MODEL D 
YPC -0.030*** -0.026*** -0.023*** -0.017*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
URATE - -  0.140***  0.091** 
   (0.046) (0.044) 
BANK -0.037*** -0.061*** -0.032*** -0.065*** 
 (0.011) (0.013) (0.010) (0.011) 
ELECTRO -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.006*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
INT -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.012*** -0.011*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
EVAS1  0.006***  0.006***  0.009***  0.006*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
EVAS2  0.027***  0.010*  0.019***  0.018*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) 
CRIME -  0.286*** -  0.262*** 
  (0.063)  (0.064) 
Constant  0.220***  0.222***    0.182***  0.195*** 
 (0.006) (0.006)  (0.012) (0.012) 
Observations           364           364          364          364 
Log-likelihood   959.08   963.96   961.26   965.61 
McFadden’s pseudo-R2       0.13       0.14        0.13       0.14 
Wald statistic (c2)         1969.51*** 2563.29*** 1700.19*** 2413.28*** 
su  0.022***  0.023***  0.026***  0.023*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
se  0.012***  0.012***  0.012***  0.012*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
r  0.772  0.784  0.815  0.786 
 (0.019) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) 
a  Dependent variable: CASH; MODEL A: equation [1] without unemployment rate (a2 = 0) and crime 
indicator (a8 = 0); MODEL B: equation [1] without unemployment rate (a2 = 0) but including crime 
indicator; MODEL C: equation [1] without crime indicator (a8 = 0) but including unemployment rate; 
MODEL D: equation [1] including both unemployment rate and crime indicator.    
b Standard errors in round brackets; *** statistically significant at 1%; ** statistically significant at 5%; 
* statistically significant at 10%. 
Table 2. Average size of underground economy and illegal production as % of GDP – Random Effects 
Tobit estimates a 
 Underground economy Illegal production 
 MODEL A MODEL B MODEL C MODEL D MODEL A MODEL B MODEL C MODEL D 
Mean 2005-2008 21.4% 16.5% 26.1% 17.5% -   10.9% - 10.0% 
2005 17.9% 14.5% 22.7% 14.8% - 10.2% -  9.3% 
2006 19.2% 15.0% 23.3% 15.9% -   9.6% -  8.8% 
2007 23.9% 18.0% 28.4% 19.3% - 11.3% - 10.3% 
2008 24.6% 18.5% 29.9% 19.9% - 12.6% - 11.6% 
a  Outliers were identified using the Hadi (1992, 1994) method: estimates dropped are 28 in MODEL A, 26 in MODEL B, 
21 in MODEL C, and 28 in MODEL D. 
 
 
Table 3. Average size of underground economy and illegal production as % of GDP – Random Effects 
GLS estimates a 
 Underground economy Illegal production 
 MODEL A MODEL B MODEL C MODEL D MODEL A MODEL B MODEL C MODEL D 
Mean 2005-2008 25.7% 17.9% 26.6% 18.9% -   10.1% -  9.7% 
2005 22.4% 15.9% 23.1% 16.7% -   9.4% -  9.1% 
2006 23.0% 16.4% 23.8% 17.3% -   8.9% -  8.6% 
2007 28.0% 19.4% 29.0% 20.7% - 10.5% - 10.1% 
2008 29.5% 19.7% 30.5% 20.9% - 11.6% - 11.2% 
a  Outliers were identified using the Hadi (1992, 1994) method: estimates dropped are 21 in MODEL A, 27 in MODEL B, 
21 in MODEL C, and 27 in MODEL D. 
 
Table 4. Average size of underground economy and illegal production as % of GDP – MODEL D with 
jackknifing (mean 2005-2008) a 
 Underground economy Illegal production 
 Random Effects Tobit Random Effects GLS Random Effects Tobit Random Effects GLS 
Subset 1 17.9% 19.0% 10.1% 9.5% 
Subset 2 15.7% 17.1% 11.9% 9.9% 
Subset 3 16.4% 17.2% 12.0% 9.8% 
a Observations dropped from the estimation are: the 3 largest towns in the Centre-North (Turin, Milan and Rome) 
for all years in subset 1, the 3 largest towns in the South (Bari, Naples and Palermo) for all years in subset 2, and 
the combination of the 6 largest towns in the Centre-North and the South for all years in subset 3. 
Before computing average values, outliers were identified using the Hadi (1992, 1994) method.    
    
 
Table 5. Average size of underground economy and illegal production as % of GDP – MODEL D with 
EVAS1, EVAS2 and CRIME weighted by an employment concentration index a 
 Underground economy Illegal production 
 Random Effects Tobit Random Effects GLS Random Effects Tobit Random Effects GLS 
Mean 2005-2008 19.7% 20.4% 11.2% 10.7% 
2005 16.8% 17.8% 10.4%   9.9% 
2006 17.9% 18.3%   9.9%   9.4% 
2007 21.6% 22.5% 11.7% 11.2% 
2008 22.5% 23.0% 12.8% 12.2% 
a Outliers were identified using the Hadi (1992, 1994) method: estimates dropped are 25 in the Random Effects 
Tobit model and 23 in the Random Effects GLS model. 
 
 
Table 6. Average size of underground economy and illegal production as % of GDP – MODEL D with drug 
separated from prostitution (mean 2005-2008) a 
Underground economy 
Illegal production 
A - DRUG B - PROSTITUTION 
RE Tobit RE GLS RE Tobit RE GLS RE Tobit RE GLS 
16.9% 18.3%  8.4%  8.6%  1.6%  1.6% 
a Outliers were identified using the Hadi (1992, 1994) method: estimates dropped are 36 in the Random Effects 
Tobit model and 37 in the Random Effects GLS model. 
Table 7. Average size of underground economy and illegal production as % of GDP in Southern and 
Central-Northern Italian provinces – MODEL D (mean 2005-2008) a 
 Underground economy Illegal production 
 Random Effects Tobit Random Effects GLS Random Effects Tobit Random Effects GLS 
CENTRE-NORTH 19.0% 21.2% 11.5% 11.2% 
SOUTH 14.0% 13.7%   6.7%   6.5% 
a Outliers were identified using the Hadi (1992, 1994) method: estimates dropped are 28 in the Random Effects 
Tobit model and 27 in the Random Effects GLS model. 
 
 
Table 8. Average size of underground economy and illegal production as % of GDP in Southern and 
Central-Northern Italian provinces – MODEL D with jackknifing (mean 2005-2008) a 
 Underground economy Illegal production 
 Random Effects Tobit Random Effects GLS Random Effects Tobit Random Effects GLS 
Subset 1     
CENTRE-NORTH 19.5% 21.3% 11.7% 11.0% 
SOUTH 14.3% 13.8%   6.7%   6.4% 
Subset 2     
CENTRE-NORTH 17.4% 19.1% 13.3% 11.1% 
SOUTH 11.5% 12.1%   8.3%   6.9% 
Subset 3     
CENTRE-NORTH 18.1% 19.2% 13.4% 10.9% 
SOUTH 12.1% 12.2%   8.4%   6.9% 
a Observations dropped from the estimation are: the 3 largest towns in the Centre-North (Turin, Milan and Rome) 
for all years in subset 1, the 3 largest towns in the South (Bari, Naples and Palermo) for all years in subset 2, and 
the combination of the 6 largest towns in the Centre-North and the South for all years in subset 3.  
Before computing average values, outliers were identified using the Hadi (1992, 1994) method.    
 
 
Table 9. Average size of underground economy and illegal production as % of GDP in Southern and 
Central-Northern Italian provinces – MODEL D with drug separated from prostitution (mean 2005-2008) a 
 Underground economy Illegal production 
A - DRUG B - PROSTITUTION 
 RE Tobit RE GLS RE Tobit RE GLS RE Tobit RE GLS 
CENTRE-NORTH 18.5% 20.5%  9.6%  9.8%  2.0%  1.9% 
SOUTH 13.5% 13.5%   5.9%   6.0%   0.9%   0.9% 
a Outliers were identified using the Hadi (1992, 1994) method: estimates dropped are 36 in the Random Effects 
Tobit model and 37 in the Random Effects GLS model. 
Figure 1. Geographical distribution of underground economy and illegal production as a % of GDP by 











 Appendix 1. Flows vs. stocks in the demand equation of cash payments 
The ratio of the value of cash withdrawn from bank accounts to the value of total payments 
settled by instruments other than cash (CASH) is the dependent variable in our estimated 
equation of the demand for cash payments. This represents a measure of the demand for 
untraced payments per euro of traceable ones (i.e., payments settled by bank transfers, cheques, 
credit cards).  
The transactions theory of money demand relies on liquid assets as such (e.g., M1) rather than 
on the concept of payment, the latter necessarily implying a cash flow and precise technical and 
organizational procedures by which these flows circulate in the economy. However, even in the 
presence of reliable statistics, stock indicators can be highly inaccurate for three reasons: a) 
quantifying the level of national currency used outside national borders is problematic, and this 
is particularly true in the euro area after the euro entered circulation in 2002; b) a certain 
amount of money can be held for purposes other than transactions: traditional theories of 
money demand discuss, for instance, the ‘speculative motive’ for holding money reserves; c) the 
velocity of money is assumed to be constant with respect to several GDP components, including 
the informal sector, without taking into account, inter alia, trade in intermediate goods and 
services. Hence, there may be compensatory phenomena within the same stock of banknotes in 
circulation, both between different purposes for holding money reserves, and between the use of 
cash in the formal and the informal sector. This is confirmed by the recent trend of the 
currency-to-GDP ratio in the countries belonging to the G10 and to the Eurosystem: the ratio 
has remained stable or even increased since 2004 in those countries that should have been more 
affected by the replacement of banknotes with digital money. Similar considerations hold for 
other stock-based indicators of currency demand, such as the stocks of M1 (currency and 
deposits repayable on demand). Notice that – although being a signal of a higher preference for 
liquidity – an increase in a stock-based monetary aggregate is not informative about the 
underlying reasons, including for instance the rebalancing of portfolio assets, the adjustment in 
liquidity buffers, the need to hide transactions (whether for evading taxes or because they are 
illegal). The European Central Bank has noted that, on the occasion of the so-called cash 
changeover, the stock of euro banknotes in circulation has increased (even compared to M1 or 
M2) more than the previous circulation of national currencies would have suggested (ECB, 
2008). According to he ECB, «this is reasonable, in particular, in an environment of low interest 
rates and low inflation expectations», not to mention that an estimate up to 20% percent of 
banknotes in circulation is held outside of the Euro area. It then becomes difficult – if not 
impossible – to estimate the component of cash held to settle payments within the underground 
economy using stock infomation. This is the reason why scholars interested in estimating the 
size of shadow sector using a cash demand approach should select monetary indicators more 
directly related to the transaction motive. 
In order to better clarify this issue, Figure A1 shows the recent trends of the currency-to-GDP 
and the currency-to-M1 ratios as compared to their respective flows in Italy. Two diverging 
trends can be observed: the stocks show a rising trend, while the flows are declining. An 
explanation of the increasing trend of stocks is given by the above mentioned explanation 
provided by the ECB. The decreasing trend of flows is instead consistent with the diffusion of 
electronic payment instruments in commercial transactions, which allows some substitution 
between alternative instruments, at least in the formal economy. Furthermore, the common 
trend of the two flow-based indicators confirms the higher coherence of these indicators with the 
transaction motive of the demand for cash. The combined evidence of such a ‘substitution 
effect’ of cash flows and the growing trend of the stock of banknotes suggests a slowing down of 
the overall velocity of circulation of legal money in order to meet liquidity needs other than 
purely transactional ones. All these considerations seem to support the criticisms raised to the 
traditional CDA based on the quantity theory of money. 
 
Figure A1. Monetary aggregates in Italy: stocks vs. flows 





























































Currency / (M1 - currency component of M1) (STOCK) Currency / Non cash payments in value (FLOW ) 
 Currency / GDP (STOCK) Currency / GDP (FLOW)
 
Source: own elaboration on Bank of Italy and ISTAT data. 
 
Table A1. Pearson, Spearman and Kendall tau-b correlation coefficients on different cash 
usage indicators a 
Cash usage indicator  Total cash withdrawals value flows 
on total non cash payments b 
ATM cash withdrawals                   
on POS card transactions c 
Cash expenditure share by 
Italian households d 
 Pearson correlation 
Total cash withdrawals value 
flows on total non cash payments                       1    
ATM cash withdrawals on POS 
card transactions            0.663               1   
Cash expenditure share by Italian 
households           0.717  
             
0.848               1  
 Spearman correlation 
Total cash withdrawals value 
flows on total non cash payments                       1    
ATM cash withdrawals on POS 
card transactions            0.695               1   
Cash expenditure share by Italian 
households            0.690  
             
0.793                1  
 Kendall tau-b correlation 
Total cash withdrawals value 
flows on total non cash payments                       1    
ATM cash withdrawals on POS 
card transactions            0.490               1   
Cash expenditure share by Italian 
households            0.490  
             
0.590                1  
a Each correlation index is based on data for the 20 Italian Regions. All correlation indexes are statistically significant at 1%. 
b Bank of Italy, banking statistics 2006-2008 (average annual value). 
c Bank of Italy, banking statistics 2009. 
d Bank of Italy, Survey on Household Income and Wealth, 2006-2008 (average annual value). 
 
The direct link between flow-based indicators of currency demand and the transaction motive of 
the demand for cash can also be highlighted by looking at micro-data on cash purchases 
collected by the Bank of Italy through the Survey on Household Income and Wealth. Table A1 
illustrates the correlation matrix of two different (macro) currency ratios (based on bank cash 
withdrawals flows divided by other payments transactions) and the percentage of cash 
purchases on total expenditures declared by the Italian households sample in the period 2006-
2008 (nearly the period considered in this study). The correlation coefficients are positive and 
significant in all cases. As one would expect, the ‘ATM cash withdrawals on POS card 
transactions’ ratio shows a higher correlation with the ‘Cash expenditure share by Italian 
households’ than the ‘Total cash withdrawals value flows to total non cash payments’ ratio. In 
other words, the closer is the monetary indicator to the ‘point of sales’, the higher is the 
correlation with the household cash expenditures.23 Nevertheless, the wider indicator of cash 
usage ‘Total cash withdrawals value flows to total non cash payments’ better accounts for the 
behaviour of all the economic agents – including also private firms and the public sector, besides 
the household sector – which makes it more appropriate for the purposes of the analysis carried 
out in this paper. 
 
 
                                               
23 Exhaustive data on ATM cash withdrawals and POS transactions at regional level are fully available from 2009. 
Nevertheless, the stability of payment behaviours over time makes the correlation analysis consistent even in the 
presence of a different period covered by data on cash expenditures. 
Appendix 2. Data and robustness check estimates 
This study uses an original dataset on a balanced panel of 91 Italian provinces observed over 
the period 2005-2008. This dataset merges information of four different sources: Bank of Italy 
(BdI), Guardia di Finanza (GdF, the Italian Tax Police), Istat (the Italian National Statistical 
Office), and Eurostat (the Statistical Office of the European Union). All monetary variables are 
provided by BdI. Data on provincial GDP are provided by Eurostat. The proxies for tax 
evasion are computed using data on GdF fiscal inspections for the period 2005-2008. The crime 




Table A2. Data description (definition of variables and data sources) 
Variable Definition Source 
CASH Ratio of the value of cash withdrawn from bank accounts to the 
value of total payments settled by instruments other than cash  
BdI 
Structural factors  
YPC Provincial GDP per capita Eurostat            
URATE Provincial unemployment rate Istat 
BANK Per capita number of banking accounts BdI         
ELECTRO Ratio of the value of transactions settled by electronic payments to 
GDP 
BdI and Eurostat          
INT Rate of interest on bank deposits BdI        
Tax evasion  
EVAS1 Number of specific tax audits in a province divided by its sample 
mean value (weighted by a GDP concentration index) 
GdF and Eurostat     
EVAS2 Ratio of the number of positive audits on cash registers and tax 
receipts to the number of existing POS in the province (weighted by 
a GDP concentration index) 
GdF and Eurostat 
Criminal economy 
CRIME Share of crimes violating laws on drugs and prostitution              
over the total number of reported crimes (weighted by a GDP 
concentration index) 
Istat and Eurostat          
DRUG Share of crimes violating laws on drugs over the total number of 
reported crimes (weighted by a GDP concentration index) 
Istat and Eurostat          
PROST Share of crimes violating laws on prostitution over the total number 
of reported crimes (weighted by a GDP concentration index) 
Istat and Eurostat          
 
Table A3. Descriptive statistics  
Variable  Mean 
Standard Deviation 
Min Max  Total Between  Within 
ITALY  a 
CASH 0.108 0.048 0.046 0.013 0.010 0.236 
YPC (´104 €) 2.491 0.596 0.590 0.099 1.235 3.908 
URATE 0.066 0.030 0.038 0.010 0.019 0.192 
BANK  0.584 0.193 0.189 0.042 0.236 1.177 
ELECTRO   2.100 1.728 1.598 0.672 0.538 16.638 
INT 1.247 0.488 0.265 0.410 0.472 2.909 
EVAS1 1.151 0.594 0.575 0.159 0.222 3.839 
EVAS2 0.204 0.215 0.207 0.063 0.001 1.233 
CRIME 0.023 0.020 0.019 0.004 0.001 0.116 
DRUG 0.022 0.019 0.019 0.004 0.001 0.112 
PROST 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.008 
CENTRE-NORTH  b 
CASH 0.090  0.041    0.039 0.012 0.010    0.204 
YPC (´104 €) 2.823  0.335 0.318 0.110 2.061 3.908 
URATE 0.045 0.016 0.015 0.006 0.019 0.102 
BANK  0.684           0.129 0.125 0.036 0.304 1.177 
ELECTRO   2.399           1.962 1.802 0.800 0.538 16.638 
INT 1.299           0.504 0.261 0.432 0.472 2.909 
EVAS1 1.067             0.522 0.507 0.136 0.221 2.746 
EVAS2 0.149          0.186 0.178 0.059 0.001 1.233 
CRIME 0.022          0.021 0.021 0.003 0.001 0.115 
DRUG 0.021   0.020   0.020   0.003   0.001    0.112 
PROST 0.001   0.001   0.001   0.001   0.000    0.008 
SOUTH  c 
CASH 0.148          0.038 0.036 0.016 0.063 0.236 
YPC (´104 €) 1.703           0.216 0.210 0.062 1.234 2.218 
URATE 0.116 0.032 0.028 0.016 0.053 0.192 
BANK  0.347          0.077 0.057 0.053 0.236 0.581 
ELECTRO   1.390          0.478 0.479 0.077 0.806 2.723 
INT 1.122           0.423 0.235 0.355 0.474 2.480 
EVAS1 1.350          0.699 0.678 0.205 0.387 3.839 
EVAS2 0.335          0.224 0.215 0.0718 0.037 0.983 
CRIME 0.025    0.016 0.015 0.006 0.003 0.095 
DRUG 0.025   0.016   0.015   0.006   0.004   0.094 
PROST 0.001   0.001   0.001   0.000   0.000   0.004 
a Figures based on a balanced panel of 91 provinces observed in 2005-2008 (364 total observations). 
b Figures based on a balanced panel of 64 provinces observed in 2005-2008 (256 total observations). 
c Figures based on a balanced panel of 27 provinces observed in 2005-2008 (108 total observations). 
 
Table A4. Estimated demand for cash payments (Random Effects GLS model – 91 Italian 
provinces, 2005-2008) a 
Regressors b MODEL A MODEL B MODEL C MODEL D 
YPC -0.027*** -0.024*** -0.021*** -0.018** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) 
URATE - -  0.114*  0.110* 
   (0.065) (0.064) 
BANK -0.046*** -0.054*** -0.044*** -0.053*** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
ELECTRO -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.006*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
INT -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.011*** -0.011*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
EVAS1  0.009**  0.007*  0.009**  0.007** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
EVAS2  0.018*  0.008*  0.020*  0.010* 
 (0.011) (0.005) (0.011) (0.010) 
CRIME -  0.265*** -  0.255*** 
  (0.073)  (0.069) 
Constant  0.212***  0.206***  0.189***  0.183*** 
 (0.015) (0.016) (0.026) (0.026) 
Observations           364           364           364           364 
Overall R2   0.67   0.67   0.68   0.68 
Wald statistic (c2)          299.84***          272.18***         323.00***       294.56*** 
su   0.023   0.023   0.022   0.022 
se   0.012   0.012   0.012   0.012 
r   0.789   0.789   0.773   0.776 
a  Dependent variable: CASH; MODEL A: equation [1] without unemployment rate (a2 = 0) and crime 
indicator (a8 = 0); MODEL B: equation [1] without unemployment rate (a2 = 0) but including crime 
indicator; MODEL C: equation [1] without crime indicator (a8 = 0) but including unemployment rate; 
MODEL D: equation [1] including both unemployment rate and crime indicator.    
b Robust (clustered) standard errors in round brackets; *** statistically significant at 1%; ** statistically 
significant at 5%; * statistically significant at 10%. 
Table A5. Estimated demand for cash payments – MODEL D with controls for time period 
effects a 
Regressors b Random Effects Tobit  Random Effects GLS 
YPC -0.015 (0.006)** -0.017 (0.009)* 
YPC×T2 -0.001 (0.006) -0.001 (0.005) 
URATE 0.120 (0.056)** 0.150 (0.059)** 
URATE×T2 -0.120 (0.104) -0.119 (0.092) 
BANK -0.072 (0.019)*** -0.057 (0.019)*** 
BANK×T2 -0.010 (0.016) -0.012 (0.013) 
ELECTRO -0.006 (0.001)*** -0.006 (0.001)*** 
ELECTRO×T2 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 
INT -0.013 (0.002)*** -0.012 (0.003)*** 
INT×T2 0.004 (0.004) 0.003 (0.003) 
EVAS1 0.006 (0.002)** 0.007 (0.004)* 
EVAS1×T2 0.000 (0.003) 0.000 (0.003) 
EVAS2 0.014 (0.007)** 0.010 (0.005)** 
EVAS2×T2 0.011 (0.008) 0.010 (0.010) 
CRIME 0.250 (0.075)*** 0.250 (0.105)** 
CRIME×T2 0.025 (0.089) 0.039 (0.125) 
T2 0.009 (0.018) 0.012 (0.014) 
Constant 0.195 (0.014)*** 0.180 (0.029)*** 
Observations 364  364 
Log-likelihood 972.15 - 
Overall R2 c 0.14  0.68 
Wald statistic (c2)                       2501.47*** 417.81*** 
su   0.023   0.021 
se   0.012   0.012 
r   0.795   0.758 
a  Dependent variable: CASH. Dummy T2 = 0 in the years 2005-2006 and = 1 in the years 2007-2008.   
b Standard errors reported in round brackets are robust (clustered) estimates in the Random Effects 
GLS model; *** statistically significant at 1%; ** statistically significant at 5%; * statistically 
significant at 10% 
c The value reported for the Random Effects Tobit model is the McFadden’s pseudo-R2.  
Table A6. Estimated demand for cash payments – MODEL D with jackknifing: 
subset 1 a 
Regressors b Random Effects Tobit  Random Effects GLS 
YPC -0.014*** -0.017** 
 (0.005) (0.009) 
URATE  0.110**  0.105* 
 (0.047) (0.056) 
BANK -0.068*** -0.056*** 
 (0.012) (0.015) 
ELECTRO -0.006*** -0.006*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) 
INT -0.012*** -0.012*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
EVAS1  0.006***  0.007** 
 (0.002) (0.004) 
EVAS2  0.018***  0.011* 
 (0.006) (0.006) 
CRIME  0.266***  0.251*** 
 (0.063) (0.097) 
Constant  0.190***  0.186*** 
 (0.013) (0.027) 
Observations                    352                     352 
Log-likelihood           934.02 - 
Overall R2 c      0.14             0.66 
Wald statistic (c2)     1740.47***   317.96*** 
su   0.023   0.022 
se   0.012   0.012 
r   0.785   0.775 
a  Dependent variable: CASH; the 12 observations dropped from the estimation in subset 
1 correspond to the 3 largest towns in the Centre-North for all years (Turin, Milan and 
Rome).    
b Standard errors reported in round brackets are robust (clustered) estimates in the 
Random Effects GLS model; *** statistically significant at 1%; ** statistically 
significant at 5%; * statistically significant at 10%. 
c The value reported for the Random Effects Tobit model is the McFadden’s pseudo-R2.  
 
 
Table A7. Estimated demand for cash payments – MODEL D with jackknifing: 
subset 2 a  
Regressors b Random Effects Tobit  Random Effects GLS 
YPC -0.023*** -0.023*** 
 (0.005) (0.008) 
URATE  0.052*  0.073* 
 (0.028) (0.044) 
BANK -0.062*** -0.052*** 
 (0.011) (0.015) 
ELECTRO -0.005*** -0.005*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
INT -0.009*** -0.009*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
EVAS1  0.006***  0.007* 
 (0.002) (0.004) 
EVAS2  0.010*  0.008* 
 (0.005) (0.005) 
CRIME  0.303***  0.253*** 
 (0.060) (0.096) 
Constant  0.211  0.195*** 
 (0.013) (0.026) 
Observations                    352                     352 
Log-likelihood           944.97 - 
Overall R2 c      0.14             0.68 
Wald statistic (c2)     2870.32***   285.28*** 
su   0.023   0.022 
se   0.011   0.011 
r   0.799   0.794 
a  Dependent variable: CASH; the 12 observations dropped from the estimation in subset 
2 correspond to the 3 largest towns in the South for all years (Bari, Naples and 
Palermo).    
b Standard errors reported in round brackets are robust (clustered) estimates in the 
Random Effects GLS model; *** statistically significant at 1%; ** statistically 
significant at 5%; * statistically significant at 10%. 
c The value reported for the Random Effects Tobit model is the McFadden’s pseudo-R2.  
 
Table A8. Estimated demand for cash payments – MODEL D with jackknifing: 
subset 3 a 
Regressors b Random Effects Tobit  Random Effects GLS 
YPC -0.020*** -0.022*** 
 (0.007) (0.008) 
URATE  0.073*  0.068* 
 (0.037) (0.035) 
BANK -0.064*** -0.055*** 
 (0.012) (0.015) 
ELECTRO -0.006*** -0.006*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) 
INT -0.010*** -0.010*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
EVAS1  0.006***  0.007* 
 (0.002) (0.004) 
EVAS2  0.011*  0.009* 
 (0.007) (0.005) 
CRIME  0.305***  0.250*** 
 (0.062) (0.097) 
Constant  0.205***  0.197*** 
 (0.018) (0.026) 
Observations                    340                     340 
Log-likelihood           912.20 - 
Overall R2 c      0.14             0.66 
Wald statistic (c2)     1956.23***   322.16*** 
su   0.023   0.022 
se   0.011   0.011 
r   0.796   0.793 
a  Dependent variable: CASH; the 24 observations dropped from the estimation in subset 
3 correspond to the combination of the 6 largest towns in the Centre-North and the 
South for all years.    
b Standard errors reported in round brackets are robust (clustered) estimates in the 
Random Effects GLS model; *** statistically significant at 1%; ** statistically 
significant at 5%; * statistically significant at 10%. 
c The value reported for the Random Effects Tobit model is the McFadden’s pseudo-R2. 
 Table A9. Estimated demand for cash payments a – MODEL D with EVAS1, 
EVAS2 and CRIME weighted by an employment concentration index 
Regressors b Random Effects Tobit  Random Effects GLS 
YPC -0.019*** -0.022*** 
 (0.004) (0.008) 
URATE  0.077*  0.088* 
 (0.044) (0.045) 
BANK -0.071*** -0.055*** 
 (0.011) (0.015) 
ELECTRO -0.005*** -0.005*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
INT -0.011*** -0.010*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
EVAS1  0.006***  0.007* 
 (0.002) (0.004) 
EVAS2  0.017***  0.015** 
 (0.005) (0.013) 
CRIME  0.277***  0.263*** 
 (0.067) (0.095) 
Constant  0.204***  0.196*** 
 (0.011) (0.025) 
Observations                    364                     364 
Log-likelihood           967.45 - 
Overall R2 c      0.14             0.68 
Wald statistic (c2)     2680.17***   277.85*** 
su   0.023   0.022 
se   0.012   0.012 
r   0.778   0.773 
a  Dependent variable: CASH.    
b Standard errors reported in round brackets are robust (clustered) estimates in the 
Random Effects GLS model; *** statistically significant at 1%; ** statistically 
significant at 5%; * statistically significant at 10%. 
c The value reported for the Random Effects Tobit model is the McFadden’s pseudo-R2. 
 Table A10. Estimated demand for cash payments a – MODEL D with drug 
separated from prostitution 
Regressors b Random Effects Tobit  Random Effects GLS 
YPC -0.023*** -0.019** 
 (0.005) (0.008) 
URATE  0.062*  0.108** 
 (0.036) (0.054) 
BANK -0.057*** -0.052*** 
 (0.012) (0.015) 
ELECTRO -0.005*** -0.006*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
INT -0.010*** -0.011*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
EVAS1  0.006***  0.007** 
 (0.002) (0.004) 
EVAS2  0.016**  0.011* 
 (0.005) (0.006) 
DRUG  0.239***  0.235*** 
 (0.066) (0.102) 
PROST  0.941  0.925 
 (0.775) (1.044) 
Constant  0.208***  0.184*** 
 (0.012) (0.026) 
Observations                    364                     364 
Log-likelihood           966.57 - 
Overall R2 c  0.14             0.68 
Wald statistic (c2)     2712.14***   305.93*** 
su   0.022   0.022 
se   0.012   0.012 
r   0.785   0.778 
a  Dependent variable: CASH.    
b Standard errors reported in round brackets are robust (clustered) estimates in the 
Random Effects GLS model; *** statistically significant at 1%; ** statistically 
significant at 5%; * statistically significant at 10%. 
c The value reported for the Random Effects Tobit model is the McFadden’s pseudo-R2. 
 
 
